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Summary  findings
Countries with more developed financial sectors  Denizer, Iyigun, and Owen generate their main results
experience fewer fluctuations in real per capita output,  using fixed-effects estimation with panel data from 70
consumption,  and investment growth. But the manner in  countries for the years 1  956-98.
which the financial sector develops matters.  Their general findings suggest that the risk
The relative importance of banks in the financial  management and information processing provided by
system is important  in explaining consumption and  banks may be especially important in reducing
investment volatility. The proportion  of credit provided  consumption and investment volatility. The simple
to the private sector best explains volatility of  availability of credit to the private sector probably helps
consumption and output.  smooth consumption and GDP.
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The Southeast  Asian turmoil  of the  late  1990s brought  to the forefront the  role finance
can play in propagating  and  dampening  macroeconomic fluctuations.  In this  paper,  we
investigate  this  role,  providing  empirical  evidence on the  link  between  the  depth  and
structure  of a country's  financial sector and  the severity of its  business cycles. We have
two important  findings:  First,  countries  with  more developed  financial  sectors  experi-
ence less fluctuations  in output,  consumption,  and investment  growth.  And second, the
type  of finance  matters.  Private  sector  finance  is particularly  important  in  reducing
macroeconomic  volatility.  Specifically, we show that  the  relative  supply  of credit  from
banks  is effective in  reducing  consumption  and  investment  volatility,  while a  greater
supply  of credit  to the private  sector in  general reduces consumption  and  per capita  in-
come volatility.  Overall, these results  suggest that  the risk management  and information
processing  provided  by banks  may  be particularly  important  in  reducing  consumption
and  investment  volatility,  while the  simple  availability  of credit  to  the  private  sector
helps  to smooth  consumption  and  GDP.
We find  evidence for  these  conclusions  in  two different  cross-country  data  sets.
Our  main  data  set  is a  panel  of 70 countries  spanning  the  years  1956 to  1998, which
we divide into  four time  periods.  We observe the  four  different  measures  of financial
development employed by King and Levine (1993a, 1993b) at the beginning  of each time
period and then examine their effects on the subsequent  variability  of real consumption,
investment,  and per capita  GDP growth using fixed-effects estimation  and controlling for
other factors that  may be associated  with the level of macroeconomic volatility,  such as
inflation  and foreign exchange rate  variability,  government spending,  income per  capita,
and  average growth  rates.  In addition,  we find supporting  evidence in a cross-sectional
data  set  with  which we examine  macroeconomic  fluctuations  over a greater  period  of
time,  controlling for various characteristics  of countries that  have been linked to financial
development,  such  as the  strength  of accounting  standards,  contract  enforcement,  and
the  level of corruption.  We  also  show  that  our  main  results  are  robust  to  different
estimation  techniques.
Our analysis is related to three different strands  in the literature.  The first relevant
1line of work is the one on finance and development  which conjectures that  well-developed
financial systems should strengthen  an economy's ability to absorb shocks, and therefore,
help  to  reduce  cyclical fluctuations.  Most of the  papers  in this  strand  are theoretical,
however, and  in contrast  to  our empirical  work below which examines  consumption  and
investment volatility  in addition  to GDP variability,  their focus is generally on aggregate
output  fluctuations.  In a  recent  paper,  Aghion,  Banerjee,  and  Piketty  (1999) develop
a  macroeconomic  model  based  on micro-foundations  which  combines financial  market
imperfections and unequal access to investment opportunities.  They show that  economies
with  less developed financial systems will tend to  be more volatile and experience slower
growth.  In their  model, low levels of financial development  and  the separation  of savers
from  investors  result  in  macroeconomic  fluctuations  with  the  economy  converging to
a  cycle  around  its  steady-state  growth  path.  In  contrast,  when  there  exists  a  fully
functioning  capital  market,  the economy converges to  a stable  growth  path  along which
fluctuations  are only due to  exogenous shocks.  Intuitively,  their  result  derives from the
fact that  when the financial sector is not  as well developed, the supply of and the demand
for credit  is more cyclical.  In particular,  investors  are more likely to  get locked out  of
credit  markets  when  the  economy faces  a  bad  shock,  only  to  rush  back  in  when  the
economy sustains  a good shock.  Aghion et  al.  point  out  that  the  financial sector  tends
to be less developed in non-industrialized  countries  and that  this may be one reason why
thAse economies experience more volatility.  Acemoglu and Zilibotti  (1997) also imply an
important  link between financial development  and volatility  by highlighting  the role that
diversification  plays  in reducing risk.  They demonstrate  that  when there  are indivisible
investment projects,  in the early stages of development,  diversification is not possible.  As
wealth  accumulates,  however, diversification becomes possible, investment  increases, and
investment  risk  and  volatility  is reduced.  In  another  related  paper,  Aghion,  Bachetta,
and  Banerjee (2000) show that  volatility  is most  likely to occur for open economies with
intermediate  levels of financial development.
The  second  relevant  line of work has  studied  the  effects of financial  market  im-
perfections  and  the  underlying  informational  asymmetries  on output  fluctuations.  For
example,  Bernanke  and  Gertler  (1989, 1990), Greenwald  and  Stiglitz  (1993), and  Kiy-
2otaki  and  Moore  (1997) develop dynamic  general  economic equilibrium  models where
asymmetric  information  in financial  markets  exacerbates  output  volatility.  While  the
role financial market  imperfections  play in generating  macroeconomic volatility  has not
been empirically analyzed  directly, the empirical  evidence at the micro level is support-
ive of the idea that  asymmetric  information  has real effects.  Fazzari, et al.  (1998) show
that  fixed investment  depends on firms' cash flow, which would not be the case if capital
markets  were perfect.  Microeconomic evidence of the  importance  of asymmetric  infor-
mation  has  also  been  found  by  examining  the  behavior  of firms  that  are  more  likely
to  be  subject  to  information  asymmetries.  For  example,  Gertler  and  Gilchrist  (1994)
confirm this  and  find that  the  impact  of monetary  policy  changes is larger  for smaller
firms compared to the large ones.  Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) find similar results for
banks  and show that  monetary  tightening  affects smaller banks  more than  large banks.
These findings are most relevant to what  we discuss below to the extent  that  the degree
of asymmetry  of information varies from one country to another.  It may well be that  low
or high levels of financial development are related  to the ability of economies to generate
and  process information.'  Put  differently, financial  development  indicators  may proxy
for the effects of financial imperfections  arising from information  asymmetries  or other
structural  constraints.  Thus,  a negative relationship  between financial development  and
volatility  would  generally support  the  hypothesized  role of asymmetric  information  in
propagating  business cycles.
The third  strand  of the literature  to which our work is more generally related is the
large and growing body of work-both  empirical and theoretical-on  the role of financial de-
velopment in long run macroeconomic performance.  According to these papers,  financial
intermediaries  reduce  the costs of acquiring  information  and  help to  lower transactions
costs  (Gertler,  1988 and  Levine,  1997).  In  doing so, they  help  ameliorate  information
asymmetries,  improve corporate  governance,  and  lead to  better  resource allocation.  As
a  result,  higher  levels of financial  market  development  lead to  faster  economic growth
(Boyd and  Prescott,  1986, Fischer,  1993, Goldsmith,  1969, Greenwood and  Jovanovic,
1990 and  King and  Levine,  1993a, 1993b).  Furthermore,  financial  institutions  improve
'See, for examnple,  Dewatripoint  and Maskin  (1995)  and Diamond  (1984).
3risk  management,  provide  liquidity  and  channel  funds  to  most  productive  uses  (Ben-
civenga and  Smith,  1991, and  Greenwood and  Smith,  1997).  The empirical  literature  is
supportive  of this  view,2 and  cross-country  findings are complemented  by those  at  the
industry  level.  For example,  Rajan  and  Zingales  (1998) and  Carlin  and  Mayer  (1999)
find  that  in countries  with  developed  financial  markets,  industries  that  rely relatively
more on external  financing  tend  to  grow faster.  In  contrast,  in  countries  with  poorly
developed financial systems, industries  that  depend on external  financing grow relatively
more slowly. At the firm level, new research shows that  strong  legal and market  institu-
tions  are associated  with  firm growth at  rates  faster  than  that  which  could be  realized
using  internal  funds  (Demirguc-Kunt  and  Maksimovic,  1998, 1999).  While  this  liter-
ature  does not  focus on the  macroeconomic  role of credit  markets,  it conjectures  that
well developed financial systems  are likely to better  absorb shocks and  that  banks  may
influence the  magnitude  of cyclical fluctuations.  For example,  Levine  (1998) notes  that
banks  may affect the  magnitude  of cyclical fluctuations-a  view that  is consistent  with
all  existing  empirical  studies.  Finally,  Ramey  and  Ramey  (1995) show  that  countries
with  higher volatility  grow slower and allow us to make a more direct  connection to  the
growth  literature.  Our  findings  support  the  idea  that  an  additional  channel  through
which financial development  may affect growth  is by reducing  volatility.
In summary,  existing  literature  implies several  routes  through  which finance  can
affect macroeconomic  cycles.  First,  more developed  financial  markets  and  institutions
may more efficiently match  savers and investors,  allowing the economy to  absorb shocks
more easily.  The financial  sector may also facilitate  diversification  (at  both  the micro-
economic and  macroeconomic  level) which  would reduce  risk  and  volatility.  Or third,
financial development  may be a proxy for the  extent  of information  asymmetries  which
may themselves cause increased volatility.  Initial empirical evidence is suggestive of a role
for financial development  in dampening  macroeconomic  fluctuations.  lyigun  and  Owen
(1999) present  some preliminary  evidence that  the amount  of credit  provided to the pri-
vate  sector is particularly  important  in smoothing  consumption  and  output  variability
in  economies in  which  there  are relatively  more  low-income individuals.  In  addition,
2See, for example, King and Levine (1993a, b), Levine (1997, 1998) and Levine and Zervos (1998).
4Easterly,  Islam, and  Stiglitz  (2000) use a cross-country  framework to  show that  credit
allocated  to the private  sector can reduce output  fluctuations  but  flexible labor market
institutions  do not.  This  paper  contributes  to  the works mentioned  above by building
on these initial  empirical results  to  more thoroughly  investigate  the effects of both  the
extent  and  nature  of financial  development  on  output,  consumption,  and  investment
growth variability.  Thus, it offers a combined test  of the empirical implications  of all of
the hypotheses  discussed above.
The remainder  of our paper  is organized  as follows: In  section 2, we discuss our
estimation  strategy  and data.  In section  3, we present  our main  results  and  conduct  a
sensitivity  analysis.  And in section 4, we conclude.
2.  Estimation  Strategy  and  Data
As  discussed above,  existing  studies  provide the  theoretical  motivation  for our  work.
While  each contribution  relies on different  mechanisms,  the  literature  asserts  that,  in
general,  financial development  should  reduce  macroeconomic volatility.  A test  of this
prediction  at the macro level can be  accomplished using the  following empirical  frame-
work:
i,t=  pi  +  At  +  O 1FINDEVi,t_ 1 +  2Xi,t  +  Vi,t  (1)
where Vi  t is the standard  deviation of real per capita consumption,  investment, or income
growth at time t for country i,  pi is a country-specific effect, At  is a time specific effect,
FINDEVi,t_ 1 is a measure of financial development in country i in the preceding period,
Xi,t  includes  additional  control  variables  that  may help  to  explain  volatility  and  vi,t
is the variability  in consumption,  output,  or investment  growth  not  explained  by the
regressors.3 We assume that  vi,t is uncorrelated  with  the  regressors and  is distributed
3We estimate equation (1) using a fixed-effects  estimation. Random effects estimation, if appropriate,
would provide more efficient  estimates.  However, one can argue on theoretical grounds that  random
effects is not appropriate because it is likely that  the country specific effects are correlated with the
regressors. Results from Hausman tests are mixed but,  overall, suggest that  a fixed effects strategy
is appropriate-the random-effects  model is rejected at  the 5 percent significance  level for 6 of the 12
5normally  with a mean of zero and a variance of  't. 4
The  control  variables  in  Xt  include  the  average  growth  rate  of real per  capita
income,  consumption  or  investment  at  time  t,  GROWTHt,  the  average  level of real
per  capita  income,  consumption  or  investment  at  time  t  - 1,  MEANt- 1,  the  mean
and  standard  deviation  of inflation  over the  period,  INFMEANt,  INFSTDEVt,  the
mean and standard  deviation of government spending as a share of GDP, GOVMEANt,
GOVSTDEVt,  the degree of openness of the economy as measured  by the ratio  of ex-
ports  plus imports  to  GDP, OPENt,  the  standard  deviation  of exchange  rate  changes,
FXVOLt,  and  an  index  of the  type  of political  regime,  POLITYt.  GROWTHt  and
MEANt-,  are included  because  the  standard  deviation  of growth  rates  may be corre-
lated  with  the initial  level and  the  growth  rate  of the  dependent  variables,  with  more
developed  or faster  growing economies  exhibiting  less variability.5 GOVMEANt  and
GOVSTDEVt,  are taken  into  account  to  control  for the  effects of changes  in govern-
ment  spending  on  macroeconomic  fluctuations.  Similarly,  the  political  environment,
POLITY,  may also affect economic stability.  We include OPENt  and FXVOLt  to con-
trol for the effects of external shocks on domestic macroeconomic volatilities and interact
the  two variables on the theory  that  exchange rate  volatility  should affect investment,
consumption  and output  volatility  differently in economies that  are more open.  Finally,
we also consider measures of inflation and  its variability  because they will be correlated
with  output  growth variability  when the aggregate  supply curve is upward sloping.6
To measure financial development,  FINDEV,  we use four measures proposed by
King  and  Levine  (1993a):  LLY,  which  is M2 divided  by GDP;  PRIVY,  the  ratio  of
claims on the nonfinancial private sector to GDP;  PRIVATE,  the ratio of claims on the
specifications  in Table 2.  (In the cases in which  the random-effects  model  is not rejected,  results of
random  effects  estimations  are similar  to those reported  in Table  2.) Of course,  use of the fixed-effects
estimations  restricts the interpretation  of our results to analysis  of within-country  effects.
4In addition  to adopting  this assumption  on the distribution  of errors  because  of its intuitive  appeal
for cross-country  data, we  also confirmed  it with a Cook-Weisberg  test for heteroscedasticity.
5See, for example,  Ramey  and Ramey (1995). Also,  we measure  MEAN  at time t - 1 because  it
is the stage of development  at the beginning  of the period that is the most economically  meaningful.
However,  our results  are not sensitive  to the time period  in which  we measure  MEAN.
6For  a recent  survey  of the vast literature  on the output and inflation  tradeoff,  see Erceg,  Henderson
and Levin  (forthcoming).
6nonfinancial  private  sector  to  total  domestic  credit  (excluding  credit  to  money banks);
and  BANK,  the  ratio  of deposit  money bank  domestic  assets  to  deposit  money  bank
domestic  assets  plus  central  bank  domestic  assets.7 While  all  of these  measures  are
positively  associated  with  financial development,  each  one captures  a  slightly  different
aspect  of it.  LLY  is a measure of the overall size of the financial system, while BANK
measures  the  relative  importance  of banks  within  the  financial  system.  PRIVY  and
PRIVATE  measure  the  extent  to  which financial  services are provided to  the  private
sector, with  PRIVATE  being a more direct  measure  of how credit  is allocated  to the
private  vs.  the  public  sector.  Thus,  LLY  and  PRIVY  are more general  measures  of
overall development,  while PRIVATE  and  BANK  attempt  to gauge the nature  of the
development.
We use annual  data  from 70 countries  for the period  1956 to  1998. The majority  of
our data  is extracted  from the IMF's  International  Financial  Statistics.  The exceptions
are  the  average  level  of real  GDP,  real  consumption  and  real  investment  per  capita
(MEAN),  which are calculated from the Penn World Tables 5.6, and the political regime
and  stability  variables  (POLITY),  which  come from  the  1996 version  of the  POLITY
III Dataset. 8 In order  to calculate our volatility  measure,  the  standard  deviation  of the
growth  rate  of GDP  and  its  components,  we need to collapse several years  of data  into
one time  period.  An  ideal  characterization  of the  amplitude  of the  business  cycle in
each country  and each time  period would require  a large number  of annual  observations
to  capture  both  the  upturns  and  downturns  of the  business  cycle.  However, we face
a tradeoff:  as we increase  the number  of years  in  each period,  perhaps  increasing  the
accuracy with  which we characterize  volatility,  we reduce the number  of periods  we can
use in our  fixed effects estimation,  reducing  its  efficiency.  Nonetheless,  we are  able to
create 4 time periods while still measuring volatility  over a relatively long period of time-
7See King  and Levine  (1993a)  for a detailed  description  of the calculation  of these measures.
8The POLITY  III dataset includes  ten different  variables  which  aim to measure  the level  of institu-
tional democracy  and autocracy  across  countries  over time. The results  presented  here use the variable
XRCOMP, the extent to which  executives  are chosen  through competitive  elections.  Our results are
robust to using  alternative  measures  from  this dataset: The POLIY  variable  was never  statistically
significant  in any of the estimations  possibly  because,  for many  countries,  these  variables  do not change
much over time.  Therefore,  it is difficult  to identify  their impact in a fixed-effects  estimation. The
complete  data can be accessed  at http://garnetl.acns.fsu.edu/  phensel/intlpoli.html.
79 years.  Specifically, to  obtain  our  measure  of financial  development  at  the  beginning
of the  period,  we use average  values of BANK,  LLY,  PRIVATE,  and  PRIVY  over
the  periods  1956-60, 1966-1969, 1975-1978, and  1984-1987.9 The  four time  periods  for
all other  variables  except  MEAN  correspond  to  1960-1968, 1969-1977, 1978-1987, and
1987-1998.
In summary, our main data  set contains a panel of 70 countries and 4 time periods.
For each period we observe financial development  at the beginning of the period and then
observe subsequent  fluctuations.
[See Table  1.]
Table  1 presents  summary  statistics  from the  main  data  set  and  shows that  the
volatility  of real per  capita  GDP  growth,  real per  capita  consumption  growth,  and  real
per  capita  investment  growth  are all  positively  associated,  with  the  strongest  correla-
tion  being  that  between  consumption  and  GDP.  In  addition,  with  one  exception,  all
financial  development  indicators  are negatively  correlated  with  macroeconomic  volatil-
ity.  However, despite  the fact that  each of the  4 indicators  attempt  to measure  financial
development,  the  correlations  between  these  variables  are rather  low, suggesting  that
each indicator  is in fact  capturing  a slightly different feature  of the financial system.
3.  Results
3.1.  Initial  Estimates
Table 2 presents  the results  of the estimation  of equation  (1) for the standard  deviation
of real  per  capita  GDP,  consumption,  and  investment  growth,  using  each  of the  four
financial development  indicators.
[See Table 2.]
In general  the  results  in Table  2 suggest that  financial development  is associated
9We average the  financial development measures over 4 years to  smooth through  any temporary
events that might be affecting the financial system in any given year.
8with less volatility in GDP, consumption, and investment; however the importance of
specific  indicators varies across dependent variables. Only BANK,  the relative impor-
tance of the banking industry, is significant for all three estimations.  PRIVATE  is
significant in the GDP and consumption estimation (though the coefficient  retains the
negative sign in the investment regression). PRIVY  is not significantly related to any
of the dependent variables and flips signs across the estimations. At this point we will
only note that  the relative size of the entire financial sector, LLY,  is significant only
in the consumption regression, but it has an inconsistent sign. While we defer a more
comprehensive  discussion of this result until Section 3.2 when we discuss the robustness
of all our results, we will note at this time that  we do not find this relationship to be
robust.
Interestingly, of all our other  control variables, only two consistently enter the
estimation in Table 2 in a statistically significant way. The standard  deviation of the
inflation rate is positively related to  GDP and consumption variability and exchange
rate volatility is positively related to all three dependent variables. However,  our failure
to find a statistically significant relationship between either MEAN  or GROWTH  and
the standard deviation of output, consumption or investment does not contradict earlier
work that  has shown that economies  with less fluctuations grow faster in the long run.
Each of our time periods consists of only 9 years. Thus, our results do not allow us to
make inferences  about long-run relationships.
Tables 1 and 2 present relatively low correlations between financial development
indicators and varying levels of explanatory power for each different indicator in our
3 main regressions.  Taken together,  this  suggests that  different aspects of financial
development may affect volatility of GDP and its components differently. To determine
which financial development indicator has the strongest relationship with volatility, we
conduct a  "horse race" and put  all four measures of financial development into each
regression. The results of this experiment are displayed in Table 3.
[See Table 3.]
9These results  show that  BANK  (the relative importance  of banks)  and PRIVATE
(the percentage  of credit that  is funneled to the private  sector) both  retain  some explana-
tory  power in the  GDP  and  consumption  regressions.  Furthermore,  results  in the  third
column  of Table  3 show that  BANK  is negatively  related  to investment  volatility,  but
the  positive  coefficient on PRIVY  now also becomes significant.  The  PRIVY  result,
however, will not  be robust  in subsequent  estimations.
One interpretation  of the results  in Table 3 is that  it is not  just  the overall size of
the  financial sector  but  the way in  which the  financial sector  develops that  matters  in
reducing  fluctuations.  Higher values of PRIVATE  suggest that  a larger  percentage  of
credit  is finding its way to the private  sector and  into the hands  of households,  allowing
them  to better  smooth  consumption.  Similarly, higher values of BANK  associated  with
greater  importance  of the banking  sector may also indicate  greater  availability  of credit
for households because  banks  may be an  important  source of consumer loans.  Because
consumption  is such a large  component  of GDP, it  is not  surprising  that  this  effect is
then  funneled  through  to  GDP.  On the  other  hand,  the results  in  column  3 of Table  3
show  that  the  relative  availability  of bank  credit  is the  aspect  of the  financial  system
that  reduces investment  volatility.  Perhaps  banks may be in the best  position to reduce
information  asymmetries  and  develop  longer  term  relationships  with  borrowers,  thus
reducing  the volatility  of investment.
The effect of financial development  on macroeconomic fluctuations  is economically
meaningful.  In our  sample, the  standard  deviation  of PRIVATE  is .368 and  the  stan-
dard  deviation  of BANK  is .200.  Using the  results  in Table  2, one can calculate  that
a one standard  deviation  increase  in PRIVATE  reduces the standard  deviation  of real
per  capita  GDP  growth  by .85 (about  14 percent)  and  reduces  the  standard  deviation
of real consumption  growth  by a similar  magnitude  (0.87 or about  14 percent).  A one
standard  deviation  increase  in BANK  reduces  GDP  volatility  by  1.64 (about  28 per-
cent),  consumption  volatility  by  1.86 (about  32 percent),  and  investment  volatility  by
1.99 (about  14 percent).
Although  our  measures  of financial  development  may  indirectly  incorporate  in-
ternational  capital  flows, our  results  suggest  that  the domestic  financial  system  is still
10important  in determining  volatility.  Specifically, BANK  is a measure of the importance
of banks  residing  in  that  country.  One possible  interpretation  of this  result  is that  if
international  capital  flows exacerbate  investment  volatility,  a  stronger  banking  sector
reduces their  relative  importance.
3.2.  Sensitivity  Analysis
The  previous  section  establishes  that  higher  values of PRIVATE  are  associated  with
lower values of consumption  and  GDP  volatility,  that  higher values of BANK  are as-
sociated  with  lower values of output,  consumption  and  investment  volatility,  and  that
higher values of LLY  are associated  with higher values of consumption  volatility.  In this
section we examine how robust these results  are to different data  selection and estimation
techniques.
As explained in Section 2, our main data  set contains  a measure of financial devel-
opment  at the beginning  of a time  period  and  a measure  of subsequent  macroeconomic
variability.  However, the  years we use to  calculate  initial  financial development  imme-
diately  precede those  years which we use to  calculate  subsequent  volatility.  In order  to
determine  if our results  are sensitive to  the  time  period  in which we measure  financial
development, in Table 4 we repeat  the estimations  presented in Table 2, but  this  time we
'measure  financial  development with  a five year lag between the  last year we use in the
financial development  measure and the  first year we use in the  variability  measure  (i.e.,
financial development  is measured  over the periods  1951-55, 1961-1964, 1971-1973, and
1979-1982). These results  confirm our initial  findings for consumption  and  output  vari-
ability, however, in this  case BANK  becomes insignificant  in the  investment  regression
while PRIVATE  becomes significant.
[See Table  4.]
Although  our data  set is a relatively  large macro data  set, our analysis still may be
sensitive to  outliers.  We therefore  provide another  estimate  of the relationship  between
financial development  and fluctuations  this time using a robust regression technique that
11identifies outliers and removes them or places a smaller weight on them in the estimation.
Essentially,  our procedure  excludes observations  for which  Cook's  D is greater  than  1
and  then  iteratively  selects weights for the remaining  observations  based  on the  size of
the  absolute  residuals,  with  large-residual  observations  receiving the  lowest weights. 10
Results  of this  procedure  are presented  in Table 5.
[See Table  5.]
Table  5 shows that  our  major  conclusions are  also robust  to  the new estimation
procedure:  PRIVATE  reduces fluctuations  in GDP  and consumption,  and  BANK  re-
duces fluctuations  in consumption  and  investment.  However, the investment  regressions
provide conflicting evidence.  Now, PRIVATE  enters positively  and significantly in  the
investment  regressions.  Taken together  with  the  results  in Table  4, this  result  suggests
that  the  relationship  between  investment  volatility  and  financial  development  may be
more complex than  that  which is captured  by our approach.11
As we alluded  to  earlier,  the  robust  regression  technique  reduces  the  size of the
LLY  coefficient in the  consumption  equation  considerably,  rendering  it  statistically  in-
significant.  One  reason  why the  LLY  result  may  be  particularly  sensitive  to  outliers
is that,  in  addition  to  identifying  countries  with  large  financial  sectors,  high  values of
M2/GDP  might also be signaling a central bank  that  has not been successful in stabiliz-
ing the economy.  Thus,  we can observe higher than  average M2/GDP  being  associated
with larger than average fluctuations.  In some of our observations this type of instability
may be  extreme.  Since these few observations  are not  representative  of the entire  data
set,  when they are removed, the  initially  positive  effect we identified  becomes insignifi-
cant.  While it is difficult to test  this conjecture  directly, it is supported  by the fact  that
'°See Hamilton  (1991)  for more  details  on this procedure.
"1With robust regression  techniques,  both the negative  association  of BANK  and the positive  asso-
ciation  of PRIVATE  survives  in a horse  race similar  to that displayed  in Table  3. However,  the effect
of BANK  on investment  volatility  remains  the most important of the two indicators. The results in
Table 5 indicate  that a one standard deviation  increase  in BANK  reduces  the standard deviation  of
investment  by 1.72,  while  a one standard deviation  increase  in PRIVATE  increases  it by .96.
12when we square  LLY  and include it in the regressions, we find a U-shaped  relationship
between LLY  and fluctuations  in output,  consumption,  and investment,  indicating  that
at lower levels of LLY,  an increase reduces volatility, but  at very high levels, it increases
it.  We do not  find this  same quadratic  relationship  with our other measures of financial
development.  12
PRIVY  may also be subject  to the criticism that  it is linked to stabilization  policy
implemented  by the  central bank,  but  the link may not  be as direct.  While  total  credit
to the  private sector is likely to increase during  a monetary  expansion,  the central bank
has only indirect  control  over it through  use of its  interest  rate  or money supply policy
levers.  Even so, our  inability  to  disentangle  these  two measures  of the  overall size of
the  financial system  from monetary  policy actions  could be a reason why the results  for
these two measures  do not  consistently  associate  financial  development  with  smoother
business cycles.  However, the two measures that  we find to  be the most robustly  related
to  volatility,  BANK  and  PRIVATE  are ratios  that  should  not  vary  systematically  in
the short-run  with  a change in monetary  policy.
We also considered if our results were sensitive to an alternative  means of measuring
volatility.  In the results  presented in Tables 1 through  5, volatility  of our macroeconomic
variables is calculated using the standard  deviations  of annual growth rates over a period
of years.  While  this  technique  characterizes  volatility  over  approximately  a decade,  it
requires us to collapse over 40 years of data  into 4 time periods.  An alternative  measure
of volatility  that  would potentially  offer more efficient estimation  of the relationship  of
interest  is to use the variability  of the error term from a GARCH process to calculate the
variance of each of our macroeconomic series on an annual  basis. 13 Of course, since the
GARCH process uses data  from all time  periods  to  estimate  the variance  in any  given
year, we are no longer able to get a  "clean" look at initial levels of financial development
12A full set of results for all estimations not detailed in the text  is available from the authors upon
request.
'3Specifically,  for all variables in our estimation for which we previously calculated standard deviations
(both dependent and independent variables), we now calculate the variance of the error term from a
GARCH(1,1)  process for that series. Using the coefficients  on the estimated GARCH(1,1) equation, we
transform the variance of the error term to obtain the variance of the dependent variable in the GARCH
estimation. Results from this procedure are available  upon request.
13and subsequent volatility as we do in our main estimations.  Thus, we present these results
only as supplementary  to our initial findings.  Nonetheless, the results from this procedure
confirm many of our initial  findings-PRIVATE  is negatively  related  to  the variability
of GDP, consumption,  and investment  growth and BANK  is negatively related  to GDP
variability.  Consistent with  the mixed nature  of results  we have reported  for investment
variability,  BANK  is positively  associated  with  the variability  of investment  calculated
in this manner.
Finally,  an  additional  possibility  that  we consider  here  is that  our  finding of a
negative association between financial development and reduced volatility  is being driven
by the developed countries in our sample which have both  developed financial sectors and
lower macroeconomic volatility.  Although we do not report the results here, we confirmed
that  our major conclusions still hold even when we drop high income countries  from our
sample."4 Our results  are  also robust  to  using a logarithmic  specification  for either  of
our  three  dependent  variables  or for the  measure  of financial  development.  Thus,  the
relationship  we identify is not  likely to be the result of a an omitted  variable common to
high income countries that  also are likely to have more developed financial sectors.
3.3.  Further  Discussion
So far, our results  indicate  that  the manner  in which the financial sector develops could
have  important  implications  for  the  severity  of the  business  cycle.  Others  have  sug-
gested  that  the financial  system  is in  fact  influenced by several  important  underlying
characteristics  of the economy (e.g., La Porta  et al., 1997, 1998, Levine, 1998, 1999, and
Demirguc-Kunt  and  Levine, 1999).
These characteristics  may be linked to macroeconomic fluctuations  and it would be
desirable  to separate  them  out  from the country-specific fixed effect we estimate  above.
VVhile  panel data  is not  available to  allow us to  do this  in our main  estimation,  we are
able to implement  a cross-country  regression for a subset of the countries  in our panel.
The additional  variables we add to the cross-country  regressions are from La Porta
14We considered  countries  that had income  in the top quartile to be high-income  countries. These
countries  had real per capita incomes  greater  than $11,000  in the last period.
14et  al.  (1998).  In  all,  we add  5 different  variables.  ACCOUNT  is an  index  of the
strength  of accounting  standards  ranging  from  a  low of 0 to  a  high  of 90.  High val-
ues of ACCOUNT  indicate  that  companies  in that  country  are required  to have more
comprehensive  financial  statements.  ENFORCE  is an  indicator  of the  enforceability
of contracts.  It  is actually  an  average  of two separate  indices-one  which  assesses the
law and  order  tradition  of an economy and  the  second which assesses the  chances that
a  given government  will change  the  provisions  of a contract  once it  has  been  signed.
ENFORCE  ranges  from  1 to  10 with  higher values indicating  stronger  enforcement  of
contracts.  CORRUPT  is an index of corruption  ranging from one to ten with lower val-
ues indicating  a greater  incidence of government  officials demanding  special  payments.
STRUCTURE  is an  index of the  extent  to  which the financial system  is based  on the
stock market  rather  than  banks.  Higher values of STRUCTURE  imply that  the market
is relatively  more important  than banks.  Finally, our data  contains  dummy variables for
the legal origin of a country, ORIGIN  (i.e., French, English, Scandinavian  or German)."5
To implement  our  cross country  estimation,  we collapse our  data  into two time
periods  and  modify equation  (1) to  estimate
Vi,t  =  pi  +  At  +  0lFINDEVi,t,j  +  0 2Xi,t  +  f 3Zi,t-1  +  Vi,t  (2)
where Zi,t_j  includes ACCOUNT,  ENFORCE,  CORRUPT,  and STRUCTURE.
We measure  Z2,t_j  in the initial  time  period  (1976-1980) and then  measure  subse-
quent  volatility  and  Xi,t over the period  1980 to  1998.16 Thus,  our cross-country  data
set gives us some advantages.  It  allows the inclusion of additional  variables  and gives us
the  ability to measure volatility  over a much longer period of time.  Moreover, the addi-
tional  variables in our cross-country  data  set also allow us to  assess whether  or not  our
main results  are affected by endogeneity.  Reverse causation  may also be an  issue in this
1 5For a more detailed discussion of the definitions of these vaxiables, see also Demirguc-Kunt and
Levine (1999).
'6Since  we view  these  additional  variables  included  in  Z  as  country  characteristics  that  are  essen-
tially  fixed  over the  time  period  of the  data,  the  exact  timing  of  when  we measure  them  should  be
inconsequental.
15relationship-more  stable  economies may promote  greater  financial sector development."7
Clearly,  the  legal  origin of a country, which  has  been linked  to  financial  development,
is a  predetermined  and  exogenous  variable  in  the  above estimations.' 8 Hence, we are
able to use it to instrument  for financial development  in our cross-country  data  set.  Our
cross-country  data  set also has some important  disadvantages  compared  to the panel we
used for the main  results.  Not the least  of which is the small size of our data  set; data
availability  restricts  our analysis to only 27 countries.  In addition,  while we believe that
the  additional  variables  we add  are important  components  of the country-specific  fixed
effect, we do not  believe they  include all important  country  characteristics.  As a result
of these disadvantages,  we are cautious  in our interpretation  of the cross-country  results
and present them only as supplementary  to our main results.  Table 6 presents the results
of this estimation  for the variability  of per  capita  consumption  growth.1 9
[See Table 6.]
Our results  for the  per  capita  consumption  growth  regressions are generally  sup-
portive  of the  conclusions  we drew  above.  Higher  levels of BANK,  PRIVATE  and
PRIVY  are associated  with  lower volatility  of per  capita  consumption.  Per capita  GDP
and  investment regressions,  not reported  here, generate  negative but  insignificant  coeffi-
cients in three of the four GDP regressions  and  all of the investment  regressions.
The  coefficients on the additional  country  characteristics  we were able  to include
in the  cross-country  regressions also suggest some interesting  conclusions.  Stronger  ac-
counting  standards  are associated  with  lower variability  of consumption  in two regres-
sions, while exchange  rate  volatility  is robustly  and  positively  related  to  consumption
variability  in three  out  of four specifications.  Surprisingly,  less corrupt  governments  are
1 7While our use of initial financial development and  subsequent volatility somewhat addresses this
issue, it is interesting to reverse this estimation and examine the effect of initial volatility and subsequent
financial development.  When we use the two non-overlapping periods of financial development and
volatility in the panel data, however,  we find no evidence for this reverse causality.
'8For more detailed discussions,  see La Porta et al (1998) and Beck, Levine  and Loayza (2000a, 2000b).
19We were not able to obtain statistically significant results for the financial development  variables in
the GDP and investment estimations, and we do not report them here.
16associated  with  higher  variability  of consumption  in all four regressions.  One possible
explanation  for this  counter-intuitive  result  is that  the  elements of corruption  that  cre-
ate  volatility  manifest  themselves  in  enforceability  of contracts  and  in  the  strength  of
accounting  standards.  Thus,  the  positive  relationship  we find between  corruption  and
stability  is only a  partial  effect after  controlling  for the  most  damaging  effects of cor-
ruption.  This  conjecture  is supported  by  the  fact  that  the  raw  correlations  between
corruption  and volatility  indicate  that  more corrupt  economies have greater  volatility.  A
possible interpretation  of our finding is that,  after controlling for these variables,  consis-
tent  and  predictable  corruption  has  a stabilizing  component.  Finally,  STRUCTURE,
the reliance of the economy on the stock market  relative  to  banks, enters  positively and
significantly  in  two of the  four  consumption  regressions.  These  results  would be  con-
sistent  with  a wealth  effect that  stimulated  consumption  through  appreciation  in stock
market  wealth.  However, it is doubtful that  this  effect would be identifiable in aggregate
data  for most  of the  countries in our sample.
4.  Conclusion
There exist at least  three  different but  related  strands  in the  economic literature  which
assert or imply that  financial development should reduce macroeconomic volatility.  Panel
data  from 70 countries  covering the years between 1956 through  1998 reveal evidence in
support  of this  hypothesis.
In  particular,  we have shown above that  countries with  more developed financial
sectors  experience less fluctuations  in  real per  capita  output,  consumption  and  invest-
ment growth.  However, we have also demonstrated  that  the manner in which the financial
sector develops matters.  The importance  of banks  in the financial system  is the most ro-
bust in explaining consumption  and investment volatility,  whereas the relative amount of
credit  supplied to the private  sector has the most  explanatory  power for the volatility  of
consumption  and output.  These results  appear  to be robust to  different estimation  tech-
niques and  data  selection strategies.  Although  our data  and  methodology  do not  allow
us to distinguish  between the different mechanisms through  which financial development
17affects volatility, our general  findings suggest that  the risk management  and information
processing  provided  by banks  may be  particularly  important  in  reducing  consumption
and  investment  volatility,  while  the  simple availability  of credit  to  the  private  sector
helps to  smooth  consumption  and  GDP.
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22Table  1:  Descriptive  Statistics  and  the Correlation  Matrix
Mean  Std.  Dev.  SDGDP  SDCONS  SDINV  BANK  LLY  PRIVATE  PRIVY
SDGDP  5.88  4.93  1  .85  .59  -. 349  -. 004  -. 210  -. 265
SDCONS  6.20  5.81  ...  1  .65  -. 377  .08  -. 197  - .249
SDINV  14.0  8.93  ...  ...  1  -. 313  -. 116  -. 066  -. 293
BANK  .727  .200  ...  ...  ...  1  .048  .375  .410
LLY  .147  .077  ...  ...  ...  ...  1  -.004  .253
PRIVATE  .714  .368  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  1  .170
PRIVY  .282  .219  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  ...  1Table  2:  Fixed  Effects Estimation
Dependent  Variable: STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF GDP, CONSUMPTION,  AND INVESTMENT  GROWTH
(Annual  Rates)
GDP  C
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)
BANKt- 1 -8.18*  ...  ...  ...  -9.30*  ...  ...  ...  -9.97*
(2.89)  (3.02)  (4.82)
LLYt- 1 ...  8.40  ...  ...  ...  ll.1*  ...  ...  ...  9.92  ...
(5.56)  (5.20)  (8.95)  _
PRIVATEt- 1 _  -2.31*  ...  ...  -2.37*  ...  ...  ...  -1.32
(.643)  (.662) _  (1.84)
PRIVYt-  ...  ...  ...  -2.06  ...  ...  ...  -. 968  ...  ...  ...  4.96
(2.74)  (2.66)  (4.77)
GROWTHt  .219  .174  .193  .170  .330  .234  .280  .252  .083  .117  .084  .098
(.212)  (.216)  (.216)  (.220)  (.310)  (.319)  (.311)  (.316)  (.123)  (.122)  (.122)  (.116)
MEANt-±  .151  .014  -.008  .003  .237  .066  - .144  -.052  -. 246  - .517  -.559  - .569
(.230)  (.255)  (.250)  (.240)  (.404)  (.429)  (.431)  (.410)  (.588)  (.593)  (.571)  (.546)
INFMEANt  -.016  -.030  -.044  -.029  -.029  -.025  -.062  -.023  -.011  -.009  -.043  -.009
(.044)  (.045)  (.046)  (.045)  (.048)  (.049)  (.050)  (.049)  (.079)  (.081)  (.081)  (.080)
INFSTDEVt  .046  .056**  .067*  .053**  .074*  .066**  .099*  .064**  .049  .043  .076  .043
(.031)  (.032)  (.032)  (.032)  (.034)  (.034)  (.037)  (.034)  (.076)  (.079)  (.079)  (.078)
FXVOLt  10.8*  11.7*  13.0*  11.7*  9.20*  10.0*  12.0*  10.3*  17.9*  18.9*  20.1*  20.0*
(4.73)  (5.07)  (5.12)  (5.26)  (4.10)  (4.47)  (4.43)  (4.66)  (6.73)  (7.01)  (7.07)  (7.05)
No.  of  obs.  198  192  197  198  199  192  198  198  198  191  197  197
R2  .56  .53  .55  .54  .62  .59  .61  .59  .68  .67  .68  .67
Note: Colntry-specific  and time-specific fixed effects estimate.  Heteroskedasticity-corrected
standard  errors  are in parentheses.  *, ** respectively denote  significance at  the 5 per-
cent  and  10 percent  levels.  The  variables  GOVMEAN,  GOVSTDEV,  POLITY,
OPEN,  OPEN  * FXVOL  are included  but  not shown.Table  3:  Fixed  Effects Estimation  with  all Finance  Variables
Dependent  Variable:  STANDARD  DEVIATIONS  OF GDP, CONSUMPTION,  AND INVESTMENT  GROWTH
(Annual  Rates)
GDP  C  I
(1)  (2)  (3)
BANKt- 1 -6.88*  -7.23*  -9.81**
(2.91)  (2.94)  (5.44)
LLYt-I  5.26  7.38  7.59
(5.69)  (5.62)  (8.96)
PRIVATEt- 1 -1.54*  -1.49*  -. 354
(.583)  (.539)  (1.66)
PRIVYt- 1 1.25  2.78  9.18**
(2.73)  (2.55)  (5.40)
GROWTHt  .216  .270  .085
(.209)  (.309)  (.124)
MEANt- 1 .153  .254  -. 403
(.222)  _(.379)  (.617)
INFMEANt  - .031  - .026  .004
(.046)  (.049)  (.080)
INFSTDEVt  .057**  .068**  .038
(.031)  (.035)  (.075)
FXVOLt  12.1*  10.5*  18.8*
(5.12)  (4.45)  (6.90)
No.  of  obs.  190  190  189
J_R2  56__  .61  .68
Note: Country-specific and time-specific fixed effects estimate.  Heteroskedasticity-corrected
standard  errors  are in  parentheses.  *, ** respectively  denote  significance at  the  5 per-
cent  and  10  percent  levels.  The  variables  GOVMEAN,  GOVSTDEV,  POLITY,
OPEN,  OPEN  * FXVOL  are included but  not  shown.Table  4:  Fixed  Effects Estimation  (5 year lags)
Dependent  Variable: STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF  GDP, CONSUMPTION,  AND INVESTMENT  GROWTH
(Annual Rates)
GDP  C
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)
BANKt-U  -6.47**  ...  - -7.33*  . ..  ...  -5.06  ...  ...  ...
(3.59)  (3.43)  (4.43)
LLYt- 1 ...  5.00  ...  ...  ...  7.22*  ...  ...  ...  -3.49  ...  ...
(3.59)  (3.48)  (8.08)  i
PRIVATEt-1  ...  ...  -3.27*  .. . ...  ...  -2.84**  ...  ...  ...  -3.55*  ..  .
(1.47)  (1.49)  (1.65)
PRIVYt-l  ...  ...  ...  -. 010  ...  ..  ..  - .704  ...  ...  .... 1
(2.19)  (2.21)  _  (4.97)
GROWTHt  .187  .169  .186  .175  .229  .234  .252  .251  -.012  .115  .024  .101
(.234)  (.213)  (.222)  (.220)  (.350)  (.312)  (.333)  (.318)  (.123)  (.122)  (.120)  (.121)
MEANt- 1 .136  -.020  .168  -. 036  .238  .023  .113  -.105  -.574  -.688  -. 615  -.501
(.227)  (.269)  (.247)  (.253)  (.414)  (.436)  (.438)  (.433)  (.560)  (.617)  (.548)  (.581)
INFMEANt  -.034  -.025  -.021  -. 028  -.051  -.016  -. 053  -.023  -.015  -. 016  -.025  -.010
(.047)  (.045)  (.048)  (.045)  (.051)  (.049)  (.053)  (.050)  (.081)  (.081)  (.086)  (.081)
INFSTDEVt  .072**  .055**  .055  .055**  .106*  .063**  .096*  .064**  .072  .045  .066  .042
(.036)  (.032)  (.035)  (.032)  (.037)  (.034)  (.040)  (.034)  (.081)  (.079)  (.080)  (.080)
FXVOLt  10.5*  11.0*  12.2*  11.8*  9.23*  8.74**  10.7*  10.5*  17.6*  19.4*  17.6*  19.5*
(4.97)  (5.14)  (5.01)  (5.13)  (4.38)  (4.60)  (4.55)  (4.54)  (7.06)  (6.68)  (7.13)  (7.04)
No.  of  obs.  190  198  188  195  191  198  189  195  190  197  188  194
F` 2 .55  .53  .57  .54  .62  .59  .61  .59  .69  .66  .69  .67
Note: Country-specific and time-specific fixed effects estimate.  Heteroskedasticity-corrected
standard  errors  are in parentheses.  *, ** respectively denote  significance at the  5 per-
cent  and  10 percent  levels.  The  variables  GOVMEAN,  GOVSTDEV,  POLITY,
OPEN,  OPEN  * FXVOL  are included but  not shown.Table  5:  Fixed Effects Robust  Regressions
Dependent  Variable:  STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF  GDP, CONSUMPTION,  AND INVESTMENT  GROWTH
(Annual Rates)
GDP  C
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)
BANKt-1  .426  . ..  . ....  ..  -5.38*  ...  ...  ...  -8.58*  ...  ...  ..  .
(1.41)  (1.56)  (3.95)
LLYt- 1 -.844  ...  ...  ...  .676  ...  ...  ...  -.460  ...
(4.50)  (2.93)  (9.83)
PRIVATEt- 1 ...  ...  -1.68*  ...  ...  ...  -1.78*  ...  ...  ...  62.60*  ..
(.497)  (.512)  (.924)
PRIVYt- 1 ...  ...  ...  -2.32  ...  ...  ...  -. 577  ...  ...  ...  4.24
__  (1.70)  _  (1.68)  (4.67)
GROWTHt  .135*  .016  .025  .122**  -.047  -.103**  .034  -.062  -.063  -.176*  -.262  .049
(.063)  (.074)  (.070)  (.066)  (.082)  (.056)  (.083)  (.075)  (.082)  (.072)  (.350)  (.082)
MEANt- 1 .060  .059  .027  .107  .322  .005  .125  .196  -.098  -.015  .265  .097
(.120)  (.139)  (.130)  (.123)  (.227)  (.150)  (.223)  (.203)  (.495)  (.430)  (.349)  (.488)
INFMEANt  .024  .028  -.030  .024  -.043**  -.016  -.079*  -.005  -.045*  .105*  -. 057  -.046
(.021)  (.025)  (.024)  (.022)  (.024)  (.016)  (.024)  (.022)  (.605)  (.053)  (.043)  (.062)
INFSTDEVt  .051*  .043**  .078*  .050*  .074*  .078*  .088*  .058*  .179*  -. 016  .089*  .134*
(.021)  (.024)  (.024)  (.022)  (.023)  (.016)  (.024)  (.021)  (.059)  (.051)  (.043)  (.060)
FXVOLt  .437  2.84  6.53*  1.90  6.37*  2.65*  13.4*  2.20  7.13  9.31*  18.2*  10.9*
(1.71)  (1.97)  (1.91)  (1.80)  (1.93)  (1.29)  (1.97)  (1.78)  (5.00)  (4.23)  (3.60)  (4.99)
No.  of  obs.  198  192  197  198  199  192  198  197  198  190  197  197
Note:  Country-specific and  time-specific fixed effects estimate.  *, ** respectively  de-
note  significance at  the  5 percent  and  10 percent  levels.  The  variables  GOVMEAN,
GOVSTDEV,  POLITY,  OPEN,  OPEN  * FXVOL  are included but  not shown.Table  6:  Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation
Dependent  Variable:  STANDARD DEVIATION  OF  CONSUMPTION  GROWTH
(Annual  Rates)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
BANKt- 1 -6.23**  ...  ...  ...
(3.45)
LLYt-1 ...  1.78  ...  ...
(5.16)  _
PRIVATEt-1  _3.41**  ...
(1.56)
PRIVYt- 1 ...  ...  ...  -2.25*
(1.24)
ACCOUNTt- 1 -. 049  -. 079  -. 076*  -. 097*
(.029)  (.060)  (.024)  (.022)
ENFORCEt- 1 -. 334  -. 474  .073  - .174
(.582)  (.356)  (.368)  (.303)
CORRUPTt- 1 .395*  .500*  .434*  .386*
(.195)  (.230)  (.123)  (.140)
STRUCTUREt- 1 .442  - .105  .530*  .738*
(.313)  (.430)  (.241)  (.359)
FXVOLt  2.80  7.74*  7.71*  9.27*
(5.46)  (3.41)  (3.35)  (2.81)
No.  of  obs.  27  25  26  26
R________________  .91  .96  .97  .97
Note: Country-specific and time-specific fixed effects estimate.  Heteroskedasticity-corrected
standard  errors are in parentheses.  *, ** respectively denote significance at the 5 percent
and  10 percent  levels. The variables  MEAN,  GROWTH,  INFMEAN,  INFSTDEV,
GOVMEAN,  GOVSTDEV,  POLITY,  OPEN,  and  OPEN  * FXVOL  included  but
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